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Abstract 
This conceptual essay, which opens the special issue, examines why a student’s right to freedom of education – 
the right for a student to define their own education – is so crucial for the education itself. Four diverse 
educational approaches are considered: training, closed socialization, open socialization, and critical examination, 
along with the Bakhtinian dialogic pedagogy to reveal the need for freedom of education within each of the 
approaches and the pedagogy. The eight aspects of the right to freedom are explicated. Three major 
objections against the right are considered and rebuked: 1) the Kantian paradox of autonomy and paternalism in 
education, 2) the paradox of learning and ignorance, and 3) fear of non-participation in education without coercion. 
The legitimate limitations of the right are discussed. Finally, the two major pathways to the right – radical and gradual 
– are analyzed.
I sent the earlier draft of the paper to the Dialogic Pedagogy journal community, asking for critical commentaries. Many 
people submitted their critical commentaries involving their agreements, disagreements, associative 
readings, extensions, evaluations, and so on. My paper, their commentaries and my reply constitute this special issue. 
Three people – David Kirshner, Belkacem TAIEB, and Jim Rietmulder – chose to provide commentaries on the 
margins. I included most of their comments on the margins as a new genre to promote a critical dialogue in our 
readers. Also, Belkacem TAIEB and Matthew Shumski submitted short commentaries that I included, below, at the end 
of this article as Appendix I and II. Jim Cresswell shared the manuscript with his undergraduate psychology 
students, and one student volunteered to add her commentary. Shelly Price-Jones shared it with her international 
undergraduate students studying English at a South Korean university. Twenty-one of them chose to provide a video 
reply. I selected a few of them that attracted my attention. Finally, I chose to address some of the issues brought in the 
presented critical commentaries either as my reply on the margins or at the end of this special issue. This should 
not be taken as “the final word” in the debate, but rather a dialogic response inviting other responses in the authors 
and in the audience. 
Eugene Matusov is a Professor of Education at the University of Delaware. He studied developmental 
psychology with Soviet researchers working in the Vygotskian paradigm and worked as a schoolteacher 
before immigrating to the United States. He uses sociocultural and Bakhtinian dialogic approaches to 
education. His recent books are: Matusov, E. (2020). Envisioning education in a post-work leisure-based 
society: A dialogic perspective, Matusov, E., Marjanovic-Shane, A., & Gradovski, M. (2019). Dialogic 
pedagogy and polyphonic research art: Bakhtin by and for educators, Matusov, E. (2017). Nikolai N. 
Konstantinov’s authorial math pedagogy for people with wings, Matusov, E. & Brobst, J. (2013). Radical 
experiment in dialogic pedagogy in higher education and its Centauric failure: Chronotopic analysis, and 
Matusov, E. (2009). Journey into dialogic pedagogy. 
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Introduction: Thesis for freedom of education 
My main thesis here is rather straightforward: students must have the exclusive right to freely define 
their own education. This thesis goes beyond the right of all students having access to good education, 
although it includes that. In negative terms, my thesis bans foisted education, imposed curriculum, and 
thrust instruction. In positive terms, I insist that it is students who are the principal authors of their own 
education. Education must occur on the students’ terms because education is primarily the personal 
business of the student. All other parties and spheres – society, state, taxpayers, educational experts and 
practitioners, parents, economy, social justice, democracy, patriotism, nationalism, healthcare, etc. – their 
important interests, urgent concerns, and exciting visions (including my own as a particular dialogic 
pedagogy educator), are secondary or auxiliary for education. Of course, like in any case of the rights, at 
times, other priorities – like, for example, safety, fairness, social justice, demands from other spheres of 
human life – must take over education and students’ right for freedom of education. But in each of these 
cases, it has to be understood that this legitimate priority of another sphere compromises education as 
such rather than proclaimed that it is done in the name of it. 
My use of the term “freedom of education” is different from its use in the literature. Often “freedom 
of education” is referred to a concern about “how to accommodate the different demands of a growing 
number of non-Western immigrants” (Karsten, 2006, p. 23) and minorities – i.e., some limited curricular 
freedom, – the professional independence of educational institutions from the state censorship (Pető, 
2018), or providing parents with a school choice (Varjo, Kalalahti, & Silvennoinen, 2014). My term is 
different, shifting the locus of control and ownership of education to a student from the society, state, local 
ethnic community, or parents (cf. Douglas, 1991).  
Similarly, the term “foisted education” requires clarification. Education can be forced on a student 
by circumstances, and the student might not have much choice but to engage in it. For example, very young 
children often do not have a choice to learn their native language because young children are “thrown” into 
a particular linguistic environment. In another example, during the Covid-19 pandemic, many people are 
faced with the medical necessity to learn a new practice of social distancing, at least those who agree on it 
as a medical necessity rather than an arbitrary governmental imposition. All these cases of a lack of 
educational choice for the student do NOT constitute the phenomenon of “foisted education” I am talking 
about here because the student’s education is still driven by the student’s agency of their realization of the 
environment and/or necessities. The phenomenon of “foisted education” is defined by the designers of 
education for the student, who is not the student: the society, state, local community, educational experts, 
teachers, parents, and so on. These designers decide for the student: whether the student must engage in 
education, when, under what conditions, what to study, how to study, with whom to study, and so on. In 
foisted education, the student is position as an object rather than a subject of education. 
My justification for the thesis is existential rather than pragmatic or liberty-based. I am not going to 
argue here that students’ freedom of education will pragmatically improve educational outcomes, although 
 
1 https://www.facebook.com/groups/DPJ.two/permalink/2761274623915932/  






Dialogic Pedagogy: An International Online Journal | http://dpj.pitt.edu 
DOI: 10.5195/dpj.2020.356  |  Vol. 8 (2020) 
 
SF3 
it might be often true, at least in some cases. Similarly, I won’t argue that the realization of human liberties 
requires students’ freedom of education. However, it might be true that freedom of education – together 
with freedom of speech, freedom of conscience, freedom of religion, freedom of the press, etc. – constitutes 
the basic human rights. In contrast, I argue here that students’ right to freedom of education is the essence 
of education itself. In other words, I argue that education requires freedom. Education requires students to 
define their own education. Education primarily is the business of a student, and not the state, the public, 
the taxpayers, teachers, school, economy, educational scholars, or parents. The role of the state is to 
ensure that every student has access to the quality of education as defined and judged by the student 
themselves (Matusov & Marjanovic-Shane, 2016b). Not having this freedom injures education. Being and 
the process of education demand freedom. 
The structure of the article is the following. First, I consider why education needs freedom. Second, 
I unpack the notion of the students’ academic freedom. Third, I provide known objections against the 
students’ right to define their own education and try to rebuke them. Forth, I discuss possible limitations of 
the students’ right to freedom of education. Finally, in conclusion, I ponder about a path of achieving the 
students’ right to freedom of education. 
Why is a student’s freedom needed for education? 
I argue here that education requires a student to define their own education – i.e., freedom of 
education. But what is education? Education is a contested concept. People define it differently, depending 
on their approach to education, often disagree with each about the core educational values. I argue that, 
however education is defined, it inherently requires freedom of the student to make decisions about their 
own education. 
My colleague and I have abstracted the following four distinguished definitions and their 
corresponding practices of education: training, closed socialization, open socialization, and critical 
examination – some of which we criticized and some of which we endorsed (Matusov & Marjanovic-Shane, 
2012). I argue that, regardless of how desirable or undesirable these diverse approaches, all these 
abstracted four educational approaches need a student’s freedom for education, but, as I show below, they 
may need it differently. In addition, being a Bakhtinian dialogic educator, below, I consider the Bakhtinian 
dialogic pedagogy as a special realization of open socialization and critical examination (Matusov, 
Marjanovic-Shane, & Gradovski, 2019). 
Training involves the acquisition of discrete, self-contained, decontextualized skills, and 
knowledge. For example, learning how to use a TV remote control or rules of the addition of fractions with 
different denominators can be done and often are done through training. Similarly, the fact that the Earth 
rotates around the Sun is usually done via training as a way of recognition of a discursive pattern – without 
necessarily ever considering conflicting ideas about the relativity of the movement (Lemke, 1990; Matusov, 
2020c). When successful, training produces more or less identical performers, which can be verified by 
tests and exams. Arguably, conventional schooling/pedagogy is heavily based on training, although it may 
not be true for some innovative schooling/pedagogy: progressive and democratic. 
Closed socialization2 entails students’ socialization into a well-defined normative practice. Learning 
driving a car is probably a good example of closed socialization. Driving a car is a well-defined normative 
practice structured by traffic signs and traffic rules. However, the driving actions are not discrete and self-
 
2 Colloquially, closed socialization is often confused with training. For example, it is commonly pronounced “teacher training,” “nurse 
training,” “pilot training,” and so on, which I view as “closed socialization” and not as “training.” 
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contained, but rather holistic, embodied, contextual, and relational, at times requiring driver’s situational 
judgments and negotiating the road with other drivers. It is also embedded in other related practices like 
getting and negotiating car insurance, a driver’s legal responsibilities, filling the car with gas, using credit 
cards, paying special taxes, bringing the car for inspection and maintenance/repairs, and so on. Education 
as closed socialization has been studied by sociocultural scholars producing a conceptual framework of 
“apprenticeship,” “observations,” “peripheral participation,” “transfer of responsibility,” “community of 
practice,” and so on (Lave & Wenger, 1991; Rogoff, 1990). Closed socialization might produce different 
stylistic “identities” for the participants – e.g., “aggressive driver,” “careful driver,” “defensive driver,” 
“impulsive driver.” Still, closed socialization remains highly normative, where creativity is rarely appreciated, 
legitimized, or encouraged3. 
Open socialization is based on students’ socialization into ill-defined practices, essentially requiring 
the participants’ creativity, authorial judgment, voice, and dialogue. For example, learning creative arts is 
often open socialization. Creative, originality, voice, authorship, and judgment are both encouraged and 
appreciated. These practices, however, diverse they might be, often require authorial judgments from the 
participants fit the unique circumstances transcending the given guidelines, rules, and norms. The 
participants are viewed as unique and irreplaceable. The existing, given structures, norms, conventions, 
strategies, knowledge, skills, models, and masterpieces have to be learned, only to be transcended by the 
learners and through the learners’ own creative transcendence. The primary focus of education as open 
socialization is on promoting a student’s creative authorship in a targeted practice. 
Critical examination originates in the famous motto by Socrates, “The unexamined life is not worth 
living” (Plato & Riddell, 1973). In contrast to the all three approaches above, education is viewed 
deconstructively, as a critical examination of the life, self, society, culture, and the world (and, of course, 
education itself). To be critical, this examination has to be embedded in a critical dialogue where ideas, 
worldviews, knowledge, values, and skills are tested against alternative ideas, worldviews, knowledge, 
values, and skills. Any construction of knowledge and skills by the learners is by-productive and accidental 
to the critical deconstructive process. Like in open socialization, each learner is viewed as a unique author 
(of critical deconstruction). The primary focus of education as a critical examination is on promoting a 
student’s critical authorship. 
A particular educational practice can be a hybrid of several educational paradigmatic approaches 
described above. Also, boundaries among the listed educational approaches can be blurry at times. My 
colleague Ana Marjanovic-Shane and I do not claim that our educational typology of the four approaches 
to education – training, closed socialization, open socialization, and critical examination – is exhaustive 
(Matusov & Marjanovic-Shane, 2012). Additional approaches may exist or emerge in the future. Guided by 
my thesis, I argue that it is primarily up to a student, and not to the teacher, institution, state, or society, to 
subscribe to a particular paradigmatic educational approach listed above or to a mixture of them as well as 
to modify their subscription at any time.  
The Bakhtinian dialogic pedagogy involves the participants addressing each other while having a 
genuine interest in each other as unique human beings and in each other’s ideas. It views dialogue 
ontologically as a way of being in the world (Bakhtin, 1999; Matusov, 2009; Sidorkin, 1999). The participants 
in an ontological dialogue are expected to be surprised by each other and by themselves. Bakhtin saw the 
sense-making process as essentially dialogic: as an ephemeral relationship between an interested, 
information-seeking, question of one person and a serious and honest reply of another person (Bakhtin, 
 
3 Socialization in car racing represents a case of open socialization, see below, exactly because creativity and uniqueness is welcomed 
in the practice. 
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1986). Ontological dialogue is eventful, involving “the consciousnesses with equal rights” (Bakhtin, 1999, 
p. 6). The Bakhtinian dialogic pedagogy is a particular realization of open socialization and critical 
examination, aiming at promoting student’s creative and/or critical authorship.  
Each of the listed paradigmatic approaches to education demands a student’s freedom of 
education. However, the nature of the required freedom is different in each paradigmatic approach, 
although often overlapping. Thus, the critical examination requires a student’s freedom of deconstruction 
of ideas, values, and worldviews. Meanwhile, training requires a student’s freedom to commit to training. 
Below I consider these relationships starting with the strongest in education as critical examination and 
proceed to the weakest relationship as training. 
Freedom in education as a critical examination 
Probably, the strongest demand for a student’s freedom to define their own education is in 
education as a critical examination approach. In this approach, the student is the ultimate author of the 
critical examination of their life, self, world, culture, and society, including their own education. The critical 
examination cannot be assigned by the others, but only self-assigned.  
Nevertheless, a critical examination can be provoked by a teacher, and this is the biggest 
temptation for some progressive educators, who might want to engage their students’ critical examination 
through dialogic provocations, whether the students want it or not. One of the first such progressive 
educators was arguably Socrates, who was the first known philosopher who defined critical examination 
and who wanted to engage all his fellow citizens of Athens in this critical examination (Matusov, 2009, see 
chapters 1 and 2). Another temptation is coming from the social justice minded educators who want their 
students to become good citizens through critical pedagogy – to become free from bigotry, racism, sexism, 
classism, homophobia, xenophobia, and so on through the students’ critical examination of their own dear 
ideas and values, which are often full of invisible and unexamined oppressive prejudices. These educators 
want to use critical examination to cure their students of “oppressive consciousness” or “false 
consciousness,” which promotes injustice. A good example of that, of course, is the Brazilian educator 
Paulo Freire (1986).  
What is wrong with these two pedagogical temptations? Ironically, both progressive and social 
justice educators severely curtail education for critical examination by trying to make students to want what 
the educators want them to want. In the case of progressive educator Socrates, he wanted his students 
(e.g., Meno, Anytus) to get involved in a critical examination of their lives, whether they wanted (e.g., Meno) 
or not (e.g., Anytus). According to Plato’s account (Plato & Bluck, 1961), Socrates was successful with 
Meno but not with Anytus. In his critique of Socrates’ progressivism, analyzing the village life of simple 
Muslim fishermen, modern political philosopher Kukathas argues that Socrates’ motto, “The unexamined 
life is not worth living” disregards the possibilities that sometimes the unexamined life might be worth living, 
while the examined life might not be worth living (Kukathas, 2001, 2003). Without students’ freedom to 
engage in an exploration of and experiential experimentation with alternatives to the examined life and 
education as critical examination, the very education as the critical examination itself will suffer. The 
teacher’s locking the student into critical examination robs the student from in-depth critical examination 
because in-depth critical examination requires the transcendence of the critical examination itself – i.e., 
students’ consideration and experience of its alternatives to the critical examination. 
In the case of social justice educator Freire, he wanted the oppressed (and even the oppressors) 
to become involved in education as critical examination aiming at liberation of the oppressed from their 
false consciousness directly or indirectly imposed on them by their oppressor. This social justice version of 
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the preset educational endpoint as making all people good, free from oppressing prejudice, is problematic 
from the critical examination vista for several reasons. First, making people predictably good through 
education or some other means strips people off their agency to make their own moral choices when these 
moral choices are disagreeable with the teachers’ ones. In one of my past classes, my students debated 
an issue raised by one of the peers: whether Hitler’s teachers were responsible for his crimes against 
humanity. Some students, probably, guided by ideas of the Enlightenment and the social justice, argued 
that since the purpose of education is to make students good, Hitler’s teachers clearly failed this goal, and, 
thus, they were (fully or partially) responsible for his crimes. Other students disagreed, arguing that 
education must inform students so they can make informed choices, including informed moral choices. For 
this perspective, Hitler’s teachers might or might not be responsible, depending on how successful they 
were informing him. Still, being informed does not preclude an educational alumnus from making bad or 
even evil choices. One of the students from the second group made a powerful and passionate speech 
arguing from a religious position that “making people good” is super disrespectful for human agency, making 
people predictable “robots,” and, she argued, even God does not want to do that leaving people with free 
will (Matusov & Lemke, 2015). 
Another problem with social justice critical education is that alternatives to the oppressor-oppressed 
binary are not considered. Not everything in life is rooted in the oppressor-oppressed totality. Life is not 
limited to liberation from oppression. Also, this social justice approach excludes the possibilities of situations 
when being the oppressed might lack of virtue, while being the oppressor might have virtue. Oppression 
might not be limited to the oppressor-oppressed binary. In other words, the totality of the oppressor-
oppressed binary itself is reductive and thus severely limits critical examination of the life, self, world, and 
society, including education itself. 
What if it is a student and not a teacher (or school, or state) who chooses to be progressive or 
social justice based in education as critical examination? Would not all the critique, provided above, be 
applied to the student as the author of their own education? If so, would the student’s freedom of education 
be failing the student’s critical examination no less than other educators would? Why would the self-
imposed limitations of critical examinations be better (better for what?) than the limitations imposed by 
others?  
In my response to these important and valid questions, I argue that a student’s self-imposition of 
the limitations on their own critical examination of the life, self, society, culture, world, and their own 
education is still better than the imposition by other because the student better preserves their own 
educational agency, which is so important, so necessary for education as critical examination. First, it is the 
student, and not others, who makes a meta-decision to limit their own critical examination. Second, it is the 
student and not others who applies the imposition of these limitations on themselves. Third, it is up to the 
student and not somebody else who decides what to prioritize to focus on their critical examination. Fourth, 
it is the student who can draw the line where to stop their critical examination (cf. “The Centipede's 
Dilemma4”). Fifth, at any moment, the student has the right to change their mind without any pressure, 
pedagogical violence, or threat of pedagogical violence by others. Sixth, it is much easier for the self-
imposing student to engage in a dialogue about the nature and goodness of the self-imposed limitations 
with other than a student on whom the limitations are imposed by others. Thus, the self-imposed limitations 
may constitute important experiences of alternative ideas for the student’s consecutive testing diverse ideas 
about their education. 
 
4 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Centipede%27s_Dilemma  
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In sum, education as a critical examination resists any impositions, positive goals, and limitations 
for its power of critical examination, including a critical examination of critical examination. It requires 
considering, testing, and, thus, partial or even full experiencing uncomfortable, unpleasant, and even 
potentially damaging alternatives – nothing is out of reach for a learner’s critical outlook in a dialogue with 
others and themselves to leave no stone unturned, at least, in principle and in the potentiality. Freedom to 
choose an alternative paradigmatic approach to education or no education at all is a part of testing ideas in 
the critical examination. 
Freedom in education as open socialization 
Why is a student’s freedom to define their own education needed for open socialization? Education 
as open socialization focuses on promoting students’ creative voices in the targeted, ill-defined practice. In 
open socialization, creativity is viewed as a legitimate process for a newcomer. Creativity is out-of-box 
thinking, feeling, relating, talking, imaging, and acting. It involves a student’s transcendence of the given – 
mostly the socially and culturally given on the macro or micro scales – recognized and appreciated by other 
and/or the student themselves (Matusov, 2011a; Matusov & Marjanovic-Shane, 2016a). Creativity and, 
thus, open socialization require the student’s freedom to define what creativity and open socialization are, 
– hence, their own education. 
However, in order for a student to engage in creativity – i.e., in transcending the given recognized 
by others – this given has to be known to the student. Some educators guiding open socialization want to 
define and impose the curriculum of the culturally important given on the students. They often sequence 
open socialization into a two-phase process: 1) the student must learn the important ready-made culture 
(e.g., learning musical notes, mechanics of playing piano), and 2) only when this mastery has been 
achieved, the educators allow the student to engage in creativity. Although this pedagogical approach does 
not deny students’ creativity, agency, authorship, and freedom, it postpones them (Matusov, von Duyke, & 
Kayumova, 2016). The major problem with this pedagogical approach is that the educators’ arrest of the 
student’s creative authorial agency until learning mastery of the culturally given is achieved, which may 
severally damage or compromise the student’s agency. Even more, during the first phase, the student may 
lose their interest in the targeted practice and in their own creativity altogether. “At the same time, the 
educators may not recognize the student’s own transcendence of the student’s given – because it may look 
to the educator as a ‘mistake of ignorance’ or some lower type of cognition (Piaget, Vygotsky) – because 
the student does not know the important cultural and social givens. This is the case when children’s 
metaphors are taken as mistakes. Thus, the educators are not in a position to promote the students’ creative 
transcendence by recognizing it as such” (Marjanovic-Shane, personal communication, March 30, 2020). 
Alternatively, some other educators engage a student in both processes at the same time: learning 
the relevant cultural given while promoting the student’s creativity (Reardon & Mollin, 2009; Schaefer-
Simmern, 1948). For example, while learning to play the piano, a student is encouraged by the teacher to 
improvise. Also, student’s mistakes are treated by the educator with the ambivalence of hunting for creative 
gems. In this approach, the student’s agency is stimulated and encouraged while the student masters the 
given, predefined by the educators. The student’s creative authorial agency is stimulated and promoted all 
the time, while the educator imposes the curriculum, education, and, to a lesser degree, instruction, and 
assessment on the student. The main problem with this pedagogical approach is that creativity is bounded 
by its material. Each material – culturally given – affords its own creativity. Selecting the specific material is 
a part of the creative process (Bakhtin, 1990). When the teacher selects and imposes the material that the 
student must learn to master and transcend, the teacher severely curtails the student’s creativity. This is 
very clear for sophisticated and recognized creative people. Switching a type of the material of their 
creativity: painting for creative musicians, music for creative writers with high probability will either destroy 
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or severely damage their creative self-expression. The issue here is not just the familiarity with the material, 
but the selectivity of the material by the author as a part of the creativity itself, who must be the student and 
not the teacher. The effect of the choice of the material on creativity may be even stronger for the novices.  
I argue that the problem of the student’s self-imposition of either the two-phase process, described 
above or the rigidity of the material choice in open socialization is much less severe, although still might be 
present, than when these impositions are external to the student. The student’s self-impositions, especially 
if they are temporary, can be a part of an experiential, experimental creative process of trying different ideas 
of their own education as open socialization. The student’s self-impositions involve a meta-decision and 
are usually free from pedagogical violence, as the student is in full control of their own agency, even when 
this agency is colonized by various pedagogical ideas. Yes, without engaging in critical examination, it might 
be more difficult for the student to notice and address this colonization, but without external impositions, 
the student has the freedom to switch to different educational approaches on a whim. 
Freedom in education as closed socialization 
As we are sliding down to more rigid educational approaches, the role of a student’s freedom 
becomes less salient, yet not negligible. I argue that the student’s most prominent freedom in closed 
socialization is the freedom to realize their own goals through the tight norms and structures of a targeted, 
highly normative practice. The first example that comes to my mind is for a student to socialize in their 
native or foreign language, with regard to its rather rigid conventional structures, norms, and rules in a 
situation when the participants focus on the normative correctness of language rather than on the pragmatic 
comprehension. Successful socialization in language means that a novice can say what they want to say 
within the strict linguistic, agreement-based, norms. Also, a successful understanding of the learned 
language means the novice’s active interpretation of the heard message into diverse contexts, again within 
strict normative frames. Closed socialization cannot be fully successful when a student does not own it. 
Essentially, successful closed socialization involves the holistic merger of the student’s goal- and context-
defining process and the tight norms and structures of the targeted practice in particular, often unique, 
situations. Pedagogical impeding the student’s learning activism and improvisation in this merger, and, 
thus, the student’s freedoms associated with it, impedes closed socialization itself. Closed socialization with 
a student’s activism and freedom to define their own goals, impeded by teachers, makes the student act 
like a zombie in the targeted practice, without much spirit. This reminds me of my learning English as a 
foreign language in the Soviet Union. 
We studied to memorize phrases like, “Pete and Mary are friends. Does Pete have a friend? Yes, 
he does. Mary is Pete’s friend. Does Mary have a friend? Yes, she does. Pete is Mary’s friend. Pete and 
Mary are friends.” In a high school, we memorized the history of the Young Communist League (Komsomol) 
written in English. In both cases, started with a pure training, the memorized phrases were extended by the 
English teachers’ novice questions about “Pete and Mary” or about the Komsomol which allowed the Soviet 
students to abstract and practice linguistic patterns and rules of English in new contexts, guided by 
disinterested normative situations and the official Communist ideology. Needless to say, not only my 
English was super limited, many of my classmates and I hated it in school.  
In contrast, my wife studied English in a specialized school in the USSR, where the main focus was 
on students’ and teachers’ self-expression in English to the point that some regular academic subjects were 
taught in English as well, and the students spoke English with each other and their teachers during their 
recesses. Still, her school exams and many assignments were focused on the formal norms and rules of 
English. She loved learning English exactly because her closed socialization, embedded in open 
socialization, in English legitimately involved and welcomed her agency of self-expression. When Russian 
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philosopher and literary theoretician Mikhail Bakhtin had to teach the formal rules and norms of Russian in 
a Soviet middle and high school, in his innovative dialogic pedagogy, he also successfully wrapped closed 
socialization into open one (Bakhtin, 2004). 
In addition, although closed socialization requires a student learning the mastery of a highly 
normative and highly structured practice, this mastery is impossible without the student assuming a unique 
social position in practice recognized by other people – oldtimers, novices, and even external observers. A 
sociocultural linguist, Jim Gee, introduced the notion of Discourse with a capital D: 
The notion of “Big ‘D’ Discourse” (“Discourse” spelled with a capital “D”) is meant to capture the ways 
in which people enact and recognize socially and historically significant identities or “kinds of people” through 
well-integrated combinations of language, actions, interactions, objects, tools, technologies, beliefs, and values. 
The notion stresses how “discourse” (language in use among people) is always also a “conversation” among 
different historically formed Discourses (that is, a “conversation” among different socially and historically 
significant kinds of people or social groups). The notion of “Big ‘D’ Discourse” sets a larger context for the analysis 
of “discourse” (with a little “d”), that is, the analysis of language in use (Gee, 2015, p. 418). 
In closed socialization, a student creates their unique participatory “accent” or “personal style” in 
the Discourse (with a capital “D”) regarding the targeted highly normative practice. This unique participatory 
accent or style in the Discourse is never given to the student. Rather, it is the student’s task to develop it. 
Without educators’ legitimization of the student’s freedom to develop this unique participatory personal 
Discourse accent, it becomes difficult for their learning the normative practice and, thus, their closed 
socialization.  
When closed socialization, with or without the help of educators, is initiated and owned by the 
student, the merger of the goal-defining process and the practice’s norms is facilitated by the student’s own 
activism and freedoms. The same is true about the process of the student’s development of their unique 
participatory personal accent or style. Owning closed socialization allows the student to make decisions of 
how much and when the student wants to transcend the boundaries of closed socialization to move it to 
creative open socialization and/or to the critical examination of the targeted practice making their education 
deeper. When closed socialization is controlled and owned by an educator, both processes are often 
inhibited. In addition, in the latter case, the student may develop resistance to the educator’s guiding efforts. 
Freedom in education as training 
Why is a student’s self-initiated and self-owned training better than training imposed by the teacher, 
for the sake of training itself? I claim the following three major mutually related reasons: relevancy, sensitive 
guidance, and motivation. When a student chooses the training curriculum – e.g., passing an SAT test for 
a college desired by the student, learning how a remote control works to manage Roku, using Zoom for 
online teaching in the coronavirus pandemic, – this self-initiated learning and its content is relevant for the 
student. This relevance guides the student’s learning by setting goals important for the student and provides 
the student with authentic formative assessment to see whether the student’s probing actions lead to 
accomplishing these goals or not and, if not, what has to be changed. This relevance mobilizes the student’s 
learning activism by asking themselves and their educators challenging and meaningful questions such as 
“how can I return back to the main menu on Roku,” which makes the educators’ guidance sensitive. The 
educators address the questions asked by the student – the questions that the student is really interested 
in and cares about – rather than the educators addressing imagined questions that the student might not 
be interested in nor ready to ask at this moment, as it often occurs in imposed training. Answering the 
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student’s real questions makes the educators’ guidance sensitive to the student’s on-demand educational 
needs. When faced with frustration or when efforts are needed, the student may invest more in the training 
of their choice than in foisted training. In self-initiated training, the student’s motivation is rooted in their 
authorial agency (Matusov, von Duyke, et al., 2016) – their desires and is self-managed, – even if this 
motivation is extrinsic and instrumental (like, for example, passing an SAT test). In imposed training, the 
motivation is usually unrooted from their authorial agency to be managed by somebody else. 
In contrast to self-imposed training, foisted training is often irrelevant, insensitive, and not very 
motivating, making training difficult for the student. Also, foisted training usually does not allow the student 
to move freely among all four paradigms of education – i.e., critical examination, open and closed 
socialization, and training itself – which often makes training shallow and difficult for the student. 
Freedom in the Bakhtinian dialogic pedagogy 
A student’s right to freedom of education – to define their own education – is the core of the 
Bakhtinian dialogic education, based on “the consciousnesses with the equal rights” (Bakhtin, 1999, p. 6). 
The equality of the rights for the participants’ consciousnesses means that the participants in educational 
dialogue have equal rights to join or leave the dialogue, define and change its topic, reply or remain silent, 
introduce ideas and values of their choices, and so on. It also means that they take seriously each other, 
expecting to be surprised by each other. They try to avoid treating each other as objects or means for their 
actions (cf. Kant), including a teacher’s treating a student as an object of their pedagogical actions. 
Curricular endpoints preset by the teacher in advance (e.g., “by the end of the lesson, the students will 
acquire the following knowledge and skills…” – a typical lesson plan statement in conventional teaching) 
are illegitimate in an ontological dialogue and, thus, in the Bakhtinian dialogic pedagogy and neither foisted 
education and imposed curriculum. Rather, the teacher can invite their students to the teacher’s dialogic 
open-ended provocations, pregnant with students’ replies unexpected by the teacher, offer alternative ideas 
and values, promote testing and examination the students’ dear ideas and values, encourage the students’ 
creative and/or critical authorship, support the emergence of the students’ unique voices, response to the 
students’ request for help, and so on. All this support and guidance has to be consented by the students in 
an ontological dialogue (Matusov et al., 2019). In sum, the Bakhtinian dialogic pedagogy is unthinkable 
without a student’s right to define their own education. 
Students’ academic freedoms: Unpacking 
Elsewhere, my colleague Ana Marjanovic-Shane and I (Matusov, 2020b, chapter 10; Matusov & 
Marjanovic-Shane, 2019) developed the organizational principles for organized education aimed at 
promoting the right to freedom of education5. These principles are based on the following multidimensional 
academic freedoms and rights of students: 
1. Curriculum: Freedom for a student to decide what to learn. 
2. Instruction: Freedom for a student to decide how, when, where, and with whom to learn and ask for 
guidance. 
3. Participation: Freedom for a student to engage or disengage, freedom to learn or not to learn, 
freedom of a no-fault divorce from any teacher or learning community. 
4. Valuation: Freedom for a student to determine what is or is not important for the student to study or 
to do, the quality, and the purpose of their education. 
5. Ecology: A right for a student to have access to and opportunity for a rich and safe educational 
environment and guidance, pregnant with and supportive of diverse discourses, practices, and 
 
5 The text below is heavily based on these published chapters and is a revised version of it. 
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6. Role: Freedom for a student to define what kind of student they want to be in every particular situation 
and overall (e.g., a credential student, a self-responsible critical learner, an other-responsible critical 
learner, a creative learner, an autodidact, an apprentice).  
7. Paradigm: Freedom for a student to choose an educational paradigm, to mix them in any way, and 
flexibly move among them.  
8. Leisure: Freedom for a student from necessities and needs such as hunger, sickness, concerns about 
shelter, concerns about safety, concerns about future well-being, and so on. 
Of course, all these academic freedoms and rights have limitations, rooted in the given history, 
culture, human biology, economy, and so on where the student is located. The student can choose only 
what is available for them as the basis of their choice as well as the material for their creative transcendence 
of the available choices. The student might limit their own freedoms by delegating some of the decision 
making to their teachers – which is still an exercise in their right to freedom of education. Also, necessities 
cannot be eliminated, and, at times, necessities can be prioritized over leisure and interfere with the listed 
freedoms and rights. Still, these academic freedoms and rights must provide aspirational guidelines for 
education. Let me zoom in on these freedoms and rights. 
Curricular academic freedom involves a student’s right to pursue his/her own academic interests, 
questions, inquiries, needs, and passions. These interests, questions, inquiries, needs, and passions may 
pre-exist in the learner or emerge in an interaction with the teacher, peers, other people, texts, experiences, 
observations, activities, and so on. For example, in my undergraduate and graduate classes, I provide my 
students with Curricular Maps (cf. Duberman, 1969). At the beginning of a semester, a Curricular Map 
involves a big list of topics that I have developed based on my own authorial judgments, on authorial 
judgments by colleagues teaching similar courses around the world (via their syllabi posted on the Internet), 
and my past students’ interests. During the semester, my current students can and do amend the course’s 
Curricular Map at any time. At the end of each class meeting, my students are engaged in selecting a topic 
for the next class. Often my students vote on the topics, but at times they want to decide by consensus, or 
by accepting several topics and splitting the class into smaller groups, or by asking me, their instructor, to 
make a choice for them, or by flipping a coin on several most popular topics of their choice. Also, students 
often try to convince their peers to join them in voting for the topic of their choice. Recently, I started 
experimenting by offering my students a list of themes (i.e., subtopics) within the chosen class topic to 
begin our discussion, which the students can always amend with their own themes during the class.  
The Curricular Map creates an image of the vast, rich, and growing field of study – representation 
of the rich and inexhaustible learning environment – for the students. This democratic process of selecting 
topics to study or themes to discuss promotes both students’ activism and ownership of their own learning 
and education. It discursively and powerfully forms their educational desire, “I want to study/learn…” 
(Matusov & Marjanovic-Shane, 2017b). This is especially important for education as critical examination 
and open socialization where the curriculum is always emerging, surprising, and, thus, cannot be preset.  
In contrast, in many conventional and some innovative schools, it is up to educational authorities 
to define and mandate curricular topics, themes, and their sequence, disabling students’ educational 
activism, desire, and ownership. The curriculum is imposed on the students. Students do not have a 
legitimate right to define their curriculum. This is often justified by their ignorance. Their educational desires 
are tabled until after school is over. Efforts are made to motivate students to engage in the school-imposed 
curriculum and/or to make the school-imposed curriculum attractive to the students, like, for example, in 
innovative, progressive education (e.g., Dewey, 1902). 
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The instructional academic freedom involves a student’s right to organize their own study in 
whatever way may fit the student. The teacher truly becomes a teacher when a student asks them for help. 
Classes, guidance, and learning activities cannot be imposed on the student but only offered and suggested 
by teachers or initiated by the student. The teacher’s pedagogical and academic freedom for and authority 
of the teacher’s authorial pedagogy must be subordinated to the student’s freedom and authority and should 
be based on the student’s consent. The student has a right to be the final authority to accept, reject, or 
modify these guiding offers, suggestions, or invitations by the teacher (Schaefer-Simmern, 1948), which is 
somewhat similar to the modern patient-doctor and client-lawyer fiduciary relationships. The student must 
have a right to choose or create their own classes, to choose or invite teachers or peers with whom to study. 
Like in the case of the Curricular Map, a teacher can develop a list of possible diverse, rich learning activities 
and projects that the student can choose from, modify, or amend with their own. Guidance cannot be 
imposed on the student by the teachers (or peers, or institutions) but can only be offered. Of course, the 
student can ask for guidance.  
In contrast, in many conventional and some innovative schools, classes, guidance, and learning 
activities are determined by school authorities and imposed on the students. Students’ instructional choices 
are illegitimate there. This often leads to insensitive guidance that generates resistance in the students to 
which many teachers reply with oppression or bribing. It also often undermines the students’ educational 
interests, desires, and confidence in their own educational aspirations and abilities. 
The participatory academic freedom involves a student’s right to move freely, in and out, to and 
from learning activities and educational communities. The student’s right of non-participation and 
disengagement must be respected and valued. The student’s non-participation, disengagement, and 
divorce from activities and communities must be viewed as legitimate and not be punished, as it is often 
the case in many conventional and even in many innovative schools, except in democratic schools 
(Rietmulder, 2019). This right creates an opportunity for a self-correcting process in educational practice, 
where the student can vote with their feet when educational practice or guidance becomes insensitive for 
their educational (or other) needs or meaningless for them (Matusov & Marjanovic-Shane, 2016b; Tolstoy, 
1967; Tolstoy & Blaisdell, 2000).  
In contrast, in many conventional and some innovative schools, participation is mandatory and 
unconditional. Students’ non-participation is viewed as illegitimate and punishable. It makes the educational 
practice insensitive and leaves it without feedback from the primary benefactor of the educational practice 
– the student him/herself. Conventional education ensures its quality by using the accountability of the 
preset curricular endpoints. Summative assessments are used to measure how each student far, close, or 
at the preset curricular endpoints. Sociocultural scholars Jean Lave and Etienne Wenger (1991) argue that 
summative assessments in education create parasitic practices that undermine the trust between the 
teacher and the student and the educational process itself (Matusov, 2009; Matusov, Marjanovic-Shane, & 
Meacham, 2016). As Bryan Caplan puts it, 
I don’t hate education. Rather I love education too much to accept our Orwellian substitute. What’s 
Orwellian about the status quo? Most fundamentally, the idea of compulsory enlightenment. Educators routinely 
defend compulsion on the ground that few students want to explore ideas and culture. They’re right about the 
students’ tastes but forget a deeper truth: intrinsically valuable education requires eager students. Mandatory 
study of ideas and culture spoils the journey (Caplan, 2018, p. 352). 
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The valuative academic freedom involves a student’s right to define the values, quality, and 
purpose of their own learning and education. In intrinsic education, the purpose, value, and quality of the 
educational activity emerge in the activity itself (i.e., “praxis” in the Aristotelian terms) and do not pre-exist 
the educational practice (i.e., “poiesis” in the Aristotelian terms) (Carr, 2006). In praxis, the initial purpose, 
value, and quality of this activity are temporary and expected to be changed. An inherent part of intrinsic 
education itself is the self-defining of the student’s educational values, goals, and qualities. The student’s 
realization of the transformation of their educational goals, values, desires, and qualities in education can 
be called meta-learning. Of course, this practice does not guarantee a good education (good for what and 
for whom?), but it is open for it. 
It is the student, not the teacher, who is the primary and final authority for educational evaluation 
of the quality of the student’s work, setting educational purposes, and defining its educational values. The 
teacher does not have a right to see the student’s work without the student’s permission (Matusov, 
Marjanovic-Shane, et al., 2016).  
In contrast, in many conventional and some innovative schools, valuation is exclusively done by 
the school authority, which increasingly includes private testing companies. Often the quality of education 
is predefined as all students successfully arriving at curricular endpoints, preset by the society, school 
authorities, teachers, and testing agencies. The hidden curriculum of such schooling involves students 
learning how to please this school authority rather than to engage in genuine education. 
The ecological right for a learner’s education involves both the access to diverse, rich, and safe 
resources, access to sensitive guidance, and the legitimacy to pursue diverse practices, discourses, and 
values. Thus, for example, at the Latin-American Community Center at Wilmington, Delaware, USA, a 
computer instructor, Mr. Steve Villanueva, has organized a Lego-Logo club for Latinx children of very 
diverse ages from 5-year old to 18-year old as a part of their afterschool program (Matusov, 2009, ch. 10). 
The Club settings involved a computer room with some children playing computer games or engaging in 
other activities unrelated to the Lego-Logo Club.  
Let me provide “a snapshot” of the activities there. In the center of the room, there were big desks 
with the Lego-Logo blocks and settings for robots designed by the children. Mr. Steve (as he is known in 
the community) was preparing the children for a national competition. This was an extremely rich and 
diverse learning environment. Some children were involved exclusively in engineering tasks of the robotics 
competition, some exclusively in programming the robots, some in in-between tasks, some were interested 
in the aesthetics of the robots, some were videotaping the work. However, some children were involved in 
robotics projects outside of the competition promoted by Mr. Steve (e.g., making robot-cars that could 
“dance” to music, like their favorite Latino wrestler Eddie Guerrero). A few very little children were sitting 
under the long desks with Lego-Logo settings and playing with small cars that they made out of Lego-Logo 
blocks. A few teenage girls were discussing romance and pregnancy symptoms. A few young boys were 
engaged in horse-playing and teasing. One boy who was engaged in an engineering task suddenly said 
that he was bored and wanted to go to play basketball. Mr. Steve commented that the boy should have left 
for basketball a half-hour before when his team had left. 
The boy left and came back half an hour later. There were many separate, overlapping, and 
dynamically emerging and shifting discourses. Children moved freely between the various activities and 
discourses. The learning environment was heterodiscursive, affording very diverse activities and discourses 
(Matusov, 2011b). Everything was legitimate. At times, Steve or some of the children asked for help from 
those children who were not engaged in preparation for the competition, but they were free to move back 
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to their activities after they helped (some did, but some did not). All-in-all, the children loved to come to the 
Club and could come and work on their activities even when Steve was not with them for whatever reason 
(Matusov, 2009, ch. 10). 
In contrast, in many conventional and some innovative schools, the learning environment is either 
sterile or highly limited, mono-discursive, unsafe, and controlled by the teacher. The students are expected 
to be on-task or on a few tasks, well defined by the teacher (and if not, the teacher may be punished by the 
school administration). The tasks and subjects are purified from “contamination” by other discourses, 
practices, and values (often couched in terms of the moniker “best practice”). In a conventional classroom, 
a tomato is always a fruit, as defined by in the scientific practice of biology, and never a vegetable as defined 
by the culinary practice. Students are often punished for making mistakes. 
Finally, the educational ecology promoting the right to a student’s freedom of education requires 
resources. My colleague Ana Marjanovic-Shane and I have developed a proposal for providing the universal 
educational voucher provided directly for all students to ensure the quality of education (Matusov & 
Marjanovic-Shane, 2016b). 
The role of academic freedom involves a student’s right to define their own mode of participation 
in each particular area, educational activity, or topic. It is up to the student to determine their own 
approaches to their own interests. The student may determine their overall educational goals as, for 
example, to become recognized by society or by a practice’s experts as a competent and capable 
practitioner through receiving a license or certificate – i.e., to assume a role of a practice-based credential 
student6. In this case, the goal of education for a credential student is to pass some qualifying tests set by 
the practice’s experts. It does not matter how the credential student will prepare for these qualifying tests: 
alone or with the help of somebody or by going to school. Passing the qualifying tests is the most important 
thing. Alternatively, a student may want to be a good authorial professional who learns in a community of 
other professionals as an apprentice. Alternatively, a student may want to engage in a critical dialogue 
about life, oneself, the world, and society. All these and other possibilities for students’ roles in education 
must be available and legitimate. Also, there should be a possibility for a student to combine or shift between 
and among these roles.  
In contrast, in many conventional and some innovative schools, the legitimate role of the student is 
single and predefined by the school authorities mostly (but not always!) involving the role of a school-based 
credential student, who successfully jumps through all the hoops that the school sets for the students.  
The paradigm freedom involves a student’s legitimate choice of educational paradigm, their 
mixture, or dynamic moving among them. A student can freely decide to engage in critical examination, 
open socialization, closed socialization, or training (with or without an educator).  
In conventional schools, the educational paradigm of training is hegemonic.  
Leisure academic freedom is based on the idea that education is a form of genuine leisure. The 
word “school” (σχολείο) in Greek means leisure (σχολή), a particular type of leisure – time that one can 
dedicate to examination oneself, of others, and of the world. The Greek notion of school does not seem 
institutional, as it is now, but rather it is a form of the human condition – namely a special type of leisure 
(Arendt, 1958) among other types of leisure like: intrinsic play, passionate endeavors, and hanging out 
 
6 This is competence credentialism and not educational credentialism. 
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conversations among friends (Matusov, 2020b, chapter 5). Institutions can assess this condition when 
needed but should not shape it.  
In contrast, conventional and many innovative schools colonize the students with assignments – 
the traditional necessity of work for children is replaced with the necessity to fulfill schools’ assignments in 
and out of the classrooms. This makes education another chore rather than a type of leisure, which is 
especially can be important for education as critical examination and open creative socialization. 
An educator has the fiduciary duty of their primary loyalty to their students (Rumel, 2013). The 
educator’s fiduciary duty is to assist the students to author their own education. This involves providing a 
safe learning environment for students when the students are not punished for their mistakes. It involves 
the freedom from impositions – still, a teacher can legitimately make suggestions, expose the students to 
alternative ideas and activities, challenge the students’ dear ideas and beliefs (at the students’ consent), 
provide guidance welcomed by the students, and so on. An educator essentially becomes a genuine 
teacher, rather than a nominal “teacher” appointed by some authority, only when a student asks them for 
help. 
Rebukes to objections to the students’ right to freedom of education 
Here I try to consider and rebuke three major known objections to the students’ right to freedom of 
education. The first objection comes from the German philosopher Immanuel Kant, who insisted that 
education is required for the realization of human dignity and, thus, it must be forced on “immature” people 
– i.e., children and ignorant adults – who are not ready to make this choice on their own. The second 
objection involves the argument that a student’s freedom of education unavoidably involves the “blind leads 
blind” situation (Jones, 1971, p. 293). The third objection is that without education being forced, most people 
and especially young children won’t engage in education at all, which will lead to the collapse of modern 
society. Of course, these are not the only possible objections to freedom of education (e.g., possible self-
segregation of education). Consideration of the other objections is outside of the scope of this paper. 
Kant’s paradox of autonomy and paternalism in education 
Objection 
In his defense and promotion of the Enlightenment’s focus on the rational autonomy as the final 
human dignity, Kant articulated a paradox of autonomy and paternalism in education (LaVaque-Manty, 
2006; von Duyke, 2013). Kant empirically noticed that people’s rational autonomy is often suppressed by 
external and internal forces. The external forces of political oppression must be remedied by political 
means. The internal forces of people’s “self-incurred tutelage” (Kant, 1784) – their ignorance and lack of 
rationality, defined as universal objective reasoning7, (“immaturity” in Kant’s term) – must be cured by 
education. Kant saw the purpose of education in fostering the autonomous agency of a student by making 
the student informed and rational8. Since people, especially children, are often “immature,” ignorant and 
non-rational people cannot be left to their own devices to decide their education. Education must be 
compulsory – i.e., forced, foisted – along with its curriculum and instruction guided by pedagogically wise 
teachers. Paraphrasing the famous rhetorical question by Auguste Comte, the founder of positivism, “If we 
do not allow free thinking in chemistry or biology, why should we allow it in education?” (cf. “research-based 
education”). Teachers and society in their wisdom and scientific advances define and impose the curricular 
 
7 Universal objective reasoning leads to the objective truth, existing out-there, independent of the human particular subjectivity. 
8 Kant’s education is instrumental to serve autonomy rather than intrinsic having its worth in itself (Matusov & Marjanovic-Shane, 
2019). 
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content on the students and make sure that the students would arrive at the correct endpoint tested by the 
universal objective reasoning mediated by exam agencies.  
However, according to Kant, education must be based on students’ freedom of reason. Teachers 
must encourage and legitimize the students’ use of their own reason, however imperfect it might be, and 
engage the students in collective and dialogic testing of their imperfect reasoning, which under the guidance 
of the skillful and intellectually honest teachers will predictably lead the students to the correct rational 
conclusion9. The authoritarian imposition of knowledge, common to Kant’s paradigm and many modern 
schools, is not legitimate. Having the freedom of reason, students do not have freedom from reason (except 
in religious education), according to Kant. One of the major by-products of this guidance is the growing 
rationality of the students, which is the basis of their future autonomy.  
Kant’s paradox is that students’ autonomy is fostered through educational paternalism by denying 
the students’ autonomy in education (except the students’ freedom to use of their imperfect reason, 
consequently guided and corrected by the teacher). Educational paternalism is the pathway to rational 
autonomy. Kant’s philosophical follower Fichte articulated it in the following way, 
Education, says Fichte quite consistently, works in such a way that “You will later recognise the reasons 
for what I am doing now.” Children cannot be expected to understand why they are compelled to go to school, 
nor the uneducated – i.e., the majority of mankind – why they are made to obey laws which will presently make 
them rational and so retrospectively justify such coercion as they may have suffered. This is the task for the State. 
“Compulsion is also a kind of education.” … If you … do not understand your own interests as a rational being, I 
cannot be expected to consult you or abide by your wishes in the course of making you a rational being. … I force 
you to be protected against smallpox though you may not wish it (Berlin & Hardy, 2002, electronic edition). 
My reply 
British philosopher Isaiah Berlin criticized philosophical monism as the possibility to harmoniously 
unite all human virtues and values. In Kant’s case, this harmonious unity of monism involves rational 
autonomy (Biesta, 2007). Berlin argued for the radical pluralism of values and virtues that cannot be fully 
known and united harmoniously in principle, 
Berlin believes that precisely because monistic visions of reality answer fundamental human needs, a 
truly consistent pluralism has been a comparatively rare historical phenomenon. Pluralism, in the sense in which 
he uses the word, is not to be confused with that which is commonly defined as a liberal outlook-according to 
which all extreme positions are distortions of true values and the key to social harmony and a moral life lies in 
moderation and the golden mean. True pluralism, as Berlin understands it, is much more tough-minded and 
intellectually bold: it rejects the view that all conflicts of values can be finally resolved by synthesis and that all 
desirable goals may be reconciled. It recognises that human nature is such that it generates values which, though 
equally sacred, equally ultimate, exclude one another, without there being any possibility of establishing an 
objective hierarchical relation between them. Moral conduct therefore may involve making agonising choices, 
without the help of universal criteria, between incompatible but equally desirable values (Kelly, 1978, p. xv). 
 
9 In this sense, Kant’s position fits progressive education (LaVaque-Manty, 2006; Matusov, 2020, submitted). 
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According to Berlin, human dignity is an unfinalizable, conflicting, and open-ended project, with the 
rational autonomy being one of its possible virtues. The pathways to these other virtues may or may not lay 
in the universal objective rationalism and Kantian’ reason-based education. 
The Kantian universal objective rationalism robs humans from their autonomy and dignity by 
making them robots of the natural laws. A Kantian rational person must discipline themselves to slavishly 
obey the natural laws of the necessity, existing out-there, independently of human consciousness. Kantian 
autonomy – freedom to reason by themselves and in dialogue with other people – is an essentially transient 
and limited process to discover or learn an unknown natural law or fact of the necessity. When the law is 
discovered and learned, discipline must prevail (Matusov, 2015a). Kant quotes a claim attributed to 
Enlightened Prussian monarch Frederick the Great, “Argue as much as you want and about what you want, 
but obey!” (Kant, 1784). This enlightened authoritarianism can be applied to Kant’s universal objective 
rationality. The despotism of aristocracy, tradition, religious dogma and personal prejudice is replaced with 
the despotism of the natural laws, including the historical laws of the societal development (cf. Hegel, Saint-
Simon, Marx). The more natural laws and facts we discover, the more slavish out behavior must be. 
There is no doubt that the Kantian virtue of knowing (always imperfectly) the natural laws and facts 
of the necessity and subordinating to these laws is important. However, as Berlin argued, there many other 
virtues that can be more important at times, which might be in conflict with Kantian virtue. For example, it 
may be mathematically true that sacrificing the life of one person is better to save the lives of three people. 
This mathematical formula is in accordance with the Kantian ethics of his categorical imperative, a moral 
law that is unconditional or absolute for all agents, time, and place, the validity or claim of which does not 
depend on any ulterior motive or end. However, it may not be true from a moral point of view (Greene, 
Sommerville, Nystrom, Darley, & Cohen, 2001). According to Bakhtin, who criticized Kant, any moral 
formula is an oxymoron. Moral can be only a human unique personal deed, embedded in a dialogue that 
challenges this deed and demands responses from the person (i.e., responsibility) (Bakhtin, 1993). 
Combining Bakhtin’s and Berlin’s philosophical frameworks, this responsible human deed addresses the 
“agonizing choices” of the unfinalizable pluralism of human values in the contested open-ended project of 
defining human dignity. 
Also, there is a contested plurality of rationality itself in addition to the contested plurality of values, 
argued by Berlin. In addition to the Kantian universal, objective, positivist, self-contained rationality, there 
are context- and practice-bound diverse rationalities (e.g., "agonistic rationality," "critical ontological 
rationality," see Matusov & Marjanovic-Shane, 2015). For example, according to universal objective 
rationality, the concept of “brother” is always relational – there cannot be just one brother (Piaget, 1985). 
However, from the relational human rationality, a brother can denounce his brother because of his 
unbrotherly deed of betrayal, as it portrayed in the movie “The Godfather II” (Matusov & Hayes, 2000). In 
contrast to the universal objective rationality, the context-bounded rationalities are often contested and 
cannot necessarily be established through a consensus. Finally, some scholars view rationality essentially 
as a social, discursive property rather than individual – e.g., as a person’s participation in an “internally 
persuasive discourse” (Bakhtin, 1991), where the “internal” is referred to the discourse and not necessarily 
to the individual (Matusov & von Duyke, 2010). 
Similarly, the notion of autonomy becomes contested from within and from outside. From outside, 
autonomy has been challenged as being the only or even primary value defining human dignity, as I 
discussed above. From within, the concept of autonomy is diversified and contested by diverse versions of 
rationality, also discussed above. Kant himself seemed to discuss different versions of autonomy: 
capricious immature autonomy, autonomy colonized by cultural and communal prejudices, uninformed 
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autonomy, and rational informed autonomy, which he valued the most. In addition, in contrast to Kant’s 
version of rational autonomy, autonomy can be based on responsibility as a person’s commitment to 
addressing the challenges of their deeds and ideas by others and the self  (cf. Bakhtin, 1993). In addition, 
a person seeking help can be viewed as a manifestation of dependency, in some versions of autonomy, or 
as autonomy, in others. There are also known cultural versions of autonomy (Rogoff, 2003). For example, 
there are cultural differences in how the members of Marquesan indigenous communities and the 
Westerners view autonomy, “Western concepts of autonomy stress the freedom of the person to pursue 
individual goals unencumbered by social obligations… Marquesans view mature adults not as those who 
give up personal goals… to conform to the group, but rather those who coordinate their own goals with 
those of the group” (Martini, 1994, pp. 73, 101). 
Unfinalizable contested pluralism of values, rationalities, autonomy, and definitions of human 
dignity undermine Kant’s call for the educational paternalism. Human dignity is not a well-defined known 
destination, but rather an open-ended contested project, tasked to humanity and to each individual person. 
Education may or may not be a pathway to the realization of this human dignity project. Besides, education 
is not reduced to the students acquiring the universal objective rationality. Instead, education is itself 
bounded by the unfinalizable contested pluralism of values, rationalities, and definitions of human dignity. 
In fact, this radical pluralism, affirmed by Berlin, is the philosophical basis for a student’s right to freedom 
of education. This principle of freedom of education was articulated by the founder of the first democratic 
school, called Summerhill, A. S. Neill, “Freedom, like peace, is indivisible. It means that you should never 
influence the choices children make. It’s all or nothing. If trust in a child is not absolute, the principle of 
Summerhill, the principle of free choice, loses all value10.” This principle of freedom of education is not 
limited by a student’s age or disability. 
Radical pluralism severely undermines the Kant-Fichte paternalistic arguments that “Compulsion 
is also a kind of education” and that forced education is akin to forced vaccination against a deadly 
communicable disease. "Compulsory education is a contradiction in terms, a central miscalculation about 
the nature of learning… in education as in love, compulsion destroys the pleasure and the inherent rewards” 
(Jerome, 1970, pp. 107, 108). Practices require competence and mastery, not (compulsory) education 
(Caplan, 2018). It is true that education can be a powerful pathway11 to a practice’ competence. However, 
it is up to a person to choose this pathway, if the person desires the entry to the practice. Kant’s thesis for 
freedom of reason in education must be extended to freedom of a diversity of reasons – not only reasons 
bounded by the universal, objective, positivist rationality, – to freedom of non-reason (e.g., intuition, 
creativity), to freedom of curriculum choice (what for the student to study), and so on. Neither the teacher 
nor society can predict what is needed for the student’s future in our civilization with rapidly accelerating 
technological and social changes. Education on-demand becomes a more and more attractive alternative 
to education as the preparation for the imaginary future (Collins & Halverson, 2009). 
The paradox of ignorance and learning 
Objection 
But, is it the “blind leads blind” situation? When a student has the freedom to define their education, 
curriculum, instruction, assessment, etc., is it not a “blind” student-as-educator leads a “blind” student-as-
learner? How can an ignorant student participate in designing a good curriculum for themselves, if the 
student is not familiar with the academic matter, they want to study? Is it not a primary, if not solely, the role 
 
10 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o58xTHGYzIY  
11 An alternative pathway to a practice’s competence is being thrown in the practice by themselves and/or others – swim or sink. The 
latter pathway was undertaken by such famous people like physicist Michael Faraday, inventor Thomas Edison, computer gurus and 
college dropouts Steve Jobs, Bill Gates, Sergey Brin and Larry Page, among many others. 
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of the teacher, who is considered to be very knowledgeable in this academic field and in pedagogy, and 
who, thus, knows better what and how the students must learn? 
My reply 
This is how I address this paradox in my past Open Curriculum Syllabus, where my students have 
a right to choose a curricular topic for their next class. I develop a list of possible curricular topics, which I 
call the “Curricular map” (Matusov, 2015b; Matusov & Marjanovic-Shane, 2017a). This list involves topics 
that I personally and professionally and my colleagues around the world teaching similar classes feel 
important in the studied field to learn, choices added by the past students, and new choices that my current 
students add. I wrote in one of my syllabi, 
This is a tough question, which, in my view, reflects one of the main paradoxes of learning, namely: On 
the one hand, a student does not know what to learn because the student is not familiar with the subject of their 
own learning. But on the other hand, learning is a transformation of the student’s subjectivity: their opinions, 
thoughts, feelings, worldviews, interests, puzzlement, and concerns. Without a student actively raising a question 
important for the student, their teacher’s answer usually remains meaningless for the student. Thus, meaningful 
guidance by the teacher starts with the student’s question.  
To address this learning paradox, I propose we constantly negotiate what we will learn to reflect your 
emerging questions, puzzlements, concerns, and interests. It is like going to an unfamiliar foreign country: the 
guide’s suggestions and the tourists’ emerging interests generate meaningful, safe, and exciting tourist 
experiences and learning. The more tourists become familiar with the foreign country, the more informed becomes 
their interests. Similarly, I hope that the more you become familiar with the vast terrain of the field, the more 
informed you will become your interests and choices of the study. 
I already asked you to reply to my Curricular Survey, based on the Curriculum Map, about your 
familiarity and interest in curricular topics of the class. The results of the Curricular Survey show, you already 
have certain interests and attractions, and also you have certain indifferences and even curricular repellences. 
Some of these indifferences and repellences may be caused by your lack of familiarity or poor learning 
experiences with these subjects, but some can be a result of your informed choice or inclination. There is also a 
potential effect of the serendipity of getting attracted (or repelled) to something that you did not care before or 
were not even aware of. As your views and interests may change during the course, we can travel in different 
territories of the curricular terrain. At the end of each class meeting, we will make a decision about what to study 
next. I’ll try to plan one week ahead. 
Of course, this is just one approach to address the paradox of ignorance and learning. An 
alternative approach for a student is to start studying something of their interest and see where it leads the 
student. Both autodidact and assisted education have their own ways to address this paradox. 
Will people engage in education on their own desire without being foisted? 
Objection 
Most children and people, in general, won’t engage in their own education unless being forced on 
them. Although education might be the primary preoccupation of students, society and the state also have 
a strong interest in education. The economy needs an educated workforce. Skillful participation in modern 
institutions needs educated clientele. Democracy and politics need educated citizens. Military needs 
educated soldiers. As one of my undergraduate teacher education students said, without being foisted, she 
would spend all her day in her bed. Young children will spend all day playing games. Most adults who may 
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need education will spend all their days engaging in idleness or entertainment. Without foisted education, 
modern society will collapse. 
My reply 
I see the following three issues in this objection: 1) instrumental education, 2) intrinsic education, 
and 3) young children. Instrumental education, aiming at primarily some educational outcomes, is often 
forced on people by the necessities. People, including very young people, either want or need to engage 
in certain immediate or future practices, which requires competence from them. Sometimes they are faced 
with obstacles that they need to overcome. Sometimes they need to solve interpersonal problems, and so 
on. Education is a powerful means to address these needs; that is why I call this education “instrumental.” 
The focus of instrumental education is on outcomes: competence, overcoming obstacles, solving problems, 
and so on. This type of instrumental education is often forced on people by the described necessities. 
However, this “personal” self-coercion by the necessities is different from the “social” coercion by teachers, 
state, and society, common to many schools. It is because the “personal” coercion by the necessities 
perceived by a student involves the rooted motivation, described above. In the “personal” self-coercion, 
education is a response to the person’s own desires to overcome the experienced current or imagined 
future necessities. In the “social” coercion, education is a societal calculation of what might be needed from 
the student in the future. A societal calculation of education is arguably much more imprecise and wasteful 
than a personal desire of learning. Also, a student’s self-disciplined study on a personal demand is more 
efficient than a student’s study foisted by the teacher (Collins & Halverson, 2009; Sidorkin, 2002, 2009). 
For example, in the UK democratic school Summerhill, a student had chosen not to attend classes on 
reading and writing – he graduated from the school being able barely to read but not to write. He was forced 
to learn reading and writing as a young adult, spending a few months on that. Eventually, he achieved an 
advanced degree in environmental studies. Later, in his reflection as a mature person, this man claimed 
that he learned in Summerhill the most important lesson of self-directed learning on his own demand 
(https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o58xTHGYzIY). In sum, voluntary instrumental education is enforced 
by the student-perceived necessities and, thus, guaranteed. 
What about intrinsic education, which involves education for education's sake – will people 
voluntary involve in such education? Is it true that only a small elite of people, with some kind of “advanced” 
brains, would desire and capable of intrinsic education? Do most people really desire only instrumental 
education to get good jobs, improve their socioeconomic status, make society better, promote patriotism, 
and so on?  
To test this inquiry, my colleagues and I conducted a study in three countries – the US, Russia, 
and Brazil – with 58 participants of different ages, with a diverse educational and vocational background. 
We called this study “The Magic Learning Pill.” In this study, we ask our research participants if they would 
take an imaginary Magic Learning Pill (MLP), would-be designed by scientists, instead of going through 
with their education, if the result of taking the Pill would be “the same,” if not better, than the result of the 
best education. We asked them to envision areas of their past education for which they might take the 
Magic Learning Pill, if at all, and for which they might not, if not at all, and why. Our results show that almost 
all participants experienced and valued both instrumental education of taking MLP for some of their 
important learning and intrinsic education of rejecting MLP for some other important learning of theirs 
(Matusov, Baker, Fan, Choi, & Hampel, 2017). Intrinsic education is less valued by modern society because 
it is a form of leisure, which often is viewed as frivolous in our necessities-based civilization (Matusov, 
2020b). In addition, intrinsic education for creativity and critical examination often undermines the societal 
stability and challenges the existing power hierarchies. In sum, at least one empirical study shows that 
intrinsic education is valued and demanded by people when there is a lesser societal pressure to force it 
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on everybody. Still, it remains an empirical question of whether most people would engage in intrinsic 
education, given a choice of leisure. 
The accumulated evidence and experiences of the existing democratic schools for about last 100 
years have shown that, indeed, when they have a choice, a high majority of young, elementary school age, 
children prefer playing over voluntary attendance of classes (Greenberg, 1991; Neill, 1960; Rietmulder, 
2019). However, democratic educators also report young children learning to read and write through play 
and through learning with peers. Also, the overwhelming majority of the democratic school graduates attend 
universities and colleges, disproportionally high to their national demographics (Rietmulder & The Circle 
School, 2015). Again, this suggests that although children may choose education as a recognizable activity 
in itself, later than it is now forced on them by others, self-chosen, self-directed education is much more 
efficient than foisted education with the imposed curriculum. Of course, one might object that the evidence 
above is coming from a self-selected population of the students of families interested in self-directed 
education. More research is probably needed. In sum, although it may be true that given a choice, many 
young children might choose to play over education, it might not be consequential for society in the long 
run because self-chosen and self-directed education is more efficient than compulsory and foisted 
education. 
Limitations of a student’s right to freedom education 
Like anything in life, a student’s right to freedom of education has its own legitimate limitations. 
These limitations are often contested and often have blurry boundaries. In other words, people may 
disagree on whether a particular limitation of the right is legitimate or how far this limitation must go. For 
example, consider safety as a limitation of freedom of education. Some parents let young children to explore 
their neighborhood or climb high on a tall tree, while some do not (Skenazy, 2009). It is a matter of judgment. 
However, most people would probably agree to object to a student’s experiential, trial-and-error, education 
of tasting unfamiliar mushrooms or touching unfamiliar snakes to distinguish the poisonous ones from non-
poisonous.  
Education for crime is probably another type of legitimate limitation. I reported a case when I was 
a physics schoolteacher in the USSR. A middle-school student of mine suggested me to teach him 
“mechanics” of robbing newspaper kiosks and making flying knives. I refused to provide him with this 
education (Matusov, 2020, submitted). Like in any fiduciary professions – e.g., legal, medical, educational, 
– there are legal limits of the practitioners’ help and servitude to their clients, patients, and students. The 
concerns about safety, legality, and morality of the students’ actions and demands on the educators my 
legitimately limit the fiduciary duty of the educators. 
Limited resources for education represent another interesting case of possible legitimate limitations 
of the right to freedom of education. Thus, a person, inspired to learn to pilot an intergalactic spacecraft, 
might be out of luck because our civilization has not developed this technology yet. In a less dramatic 
example, access to learning a particular available practice or educational resources (e.g., computers or 
access to the Internet) might be limited or even absent for a particular student. This limitation can be 
historical, local, social, economic, and political. Poverty can severely limit the right to freedom of education. 
But, is poverty a legitimate limit, historically or universally?  
What makes a limitation of the right legitimate or illegitimate? One possible outlook on the 
legitimacy of a limitation of the right to freedom of education is moral. From a moral perspective, poverty, 
as a form of injustice, is an illegitimate limitation. From a legal perspective, however undesirable, poverty 
is legal and, thus, legitimate in most modern societies. From an economic perspective, depending on a 
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particular economic doctrine, poverty might be seen as unavoidable (and again legitimate), at least, in the 
current historical time. The economic perspective becomes even more salient when the division of labor is 
considered for its legitimacy of a limitation of the right. As it is now, for our society, someone still needs to 
deliver pizza, work on assembly lines, and take garbage from the streets – jobs that might be replaced by 
smart machines in the future12. Students’ educational aspirations can be crushed by a lack of available jobs 
that might fit these aspirations. The historical situation with poverty, division of labor, types of available jobs 
(e.g., mechanical, non-creative, repetitive), or even having jobs as such may change with the advance of 
the global technological unemployment that might become a blessing rather than a curse for the right to 
freedom of education (Markoff, 2015). When the economy starts requiring fewer and fewer people for 
production and services, the conditions might be created for a leisure-based society, in which education 
can become a form of leisure (Matusov, 2020b). 
A path to a student’s right to freedom of education 
There are radical and gradual approaches to promoting the right to freedom of education. There 
are small oases where the right to freedom of education has been radically realized. I am talking about 
democratic schools like Summerhill in the UK (Neill, 1960), Sudbury Valley School in the USA (Greenberg, 
1991), The Circle School in the USA (Rietmulder, 2019), and so on. Due to the national laws governing 
educational institutions, most of the democratic schools are located in the USA. Democratic schools are 
characterized by the absence of foisted education and imposed curriculum. Students have the right to not 
engage in education and, when they engage, to choose their own curriculum13 (Rietmulder, 2019). Another 
form of organized education is homeschooling, although it is much more diverse than the democratic school 
movement. Some few homeschooling respect the students’ right to freedom of education (Llewellyn, 1998), 
but many more do not. At the higher education level, there have been some pedagogical experiments in 
democratic education that promote the full or limited right to freedom of education (Duberman, 1969, 2009; 
Gates, 2020, in press; Matusov, 2015b, 2020a; Phillips, 2002; Shor, 1996; Tompkins, 1996). There have 
been historical precedents of respecting the students’ right to freedom of education: Socrates’ circles, 
Plato’s Academy, Aristotle’s Peripatetics, and Southern European medieval universities (Cobban, 1980). 
Gradual approaches to the right to freedom of education involve opening up some limited areas of 
institutionalized education for the students’ choices and freedoms. Many educational institutions may have 
a limited right for the students to practice their freedom of education. The most limited right is probably 
freedom of participation in education, especially for young children. Most K-12 schools are based on 
compulsory education. Another highly limited right is freedom for the students to decide their curriculum 
even in higher education. Attendance is another highly limited freedom. Freedom from imposed 
assignments and assessments is rarely guaranteed, especially in conventional school institutions. Some 
progressive schools (and individual classrooms), like Montessori, Walldorf, Reggio Emilia, and so on, 
provide students with freedom from grading, imposed homework, controlled classroom movements, and so 
on. They allow more curricular, instructional, and organizational choices for their students. Some 
conventional schools and classrooms include open-ended imposed assignments, which grants some 
freedom of expression to the students. Some innovative teachers try to provide a safe learning environment 
that encourages the students to express their opinions and views in the classroom without repercussion 
when their views turn to be erroneous or unpopular. 
 
12 Elsewhere, I argue that humans were first “smart machines” (Matusov, 2020b). 
13 In personal communication, Jim Rietmulder argued that democratic schools are not completely “free-range” education, because 
although they have more freedom for education, they are still “caged” by the national laws of compulsory education and some 
oppressive restrictions. In addition, I argue that democratic schools often do not have students’ freedom from leisure. 
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On the bigger picture, in my judgment, the main obstacle for the right to freedom of education is 
the enmeshment of education with other non-educational practices and goals like educational credentialism 
aiming primarily at social mobility, keeping young children from streets and jobs, fighting against poverty 
(school lunches), promoting social justice, instilling nationalism and patriotism, social cohesion, cultural 
homogenization, assimilation of immigrants, economic social engineering, childcare, social or political 
conformism, democratic participation, instilling moral values, need-based educational assistance, and so 
on. Disentanglement education from these important needs might help to recognize that education is the 
business of the student and, thus, to promote the student’s right to freedom of education. I believe that this 
disentanglement will become possible when education as intrinsic value, rather than only instrumental, will 
become appreciated in our society (Matusov & Marjanovic-Shane, 2019). In its own turn, the appreciation 
of intrinsic education occurs when our civilization transitions from the exclusively necessity-based to a 
leisure-dominated hybrid (Matusov, 2020b). 
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Dear Eugene,  
I take the freedom of writing this as a quick letter. I want to honor my engagement while realizing that this 
type of conversations is far away from my nature. My sincere apologies for not being able to go deeper.  
I am precising that my comments are not to be published and are only a contribution from me to you. 
Analysis:  
Freedom for students. Yes or not seems to be the duality in which you inscribe your argument. But is their 
such thing as duality in freedom?  
Explained in different context, presented from different perspectives, freedom for student is the leitmotiv 
that is argued all over this article. However, sometimes I feel that what is happening here is not a 
conversation on freedom but rather a conversation that uses freedom as a subject. Freedom is perverted 
to the exercise of mental activity. In that sense, I feel that I, as an engaged reader, am taken into a spinning 
circle that does not lead me anywhere especially not to the freedom for student. 
Sometimes, it feels that I am reading a paper advocating for humanist freedom, and then I realize that I am 
reading a libertarian paper calling individualism and isolation “freedom”. These oppositions in perspectives 
presented in the same place and given the same importance make the article confusing. Where do you 
locate yourself and why for? I wonder all the way where you wish to go.  
I understand the statement “Student must be free to choose their education”. Seems pretty altruist. Why 
are they student at the very beginning? Also, I have been a teacher for around 20 years. I taught students 
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of all ages. They are all different, all have different ambitions; however, we also find commonalities. There 
is no such thing as a “student” entity. All ages are different, all people are different, all stories are different, 
while at the same time being all the same. How can we then say: “Student must be free to choose their 
education” What student, when? Where? With whom and How? We think generally and we advocate for 
individuality?  
Shall teachers forget all forms of personal agency in order to leave room for students’ experiences? If 
students are the “masters in their domains” why aren’t they teachers then? Are parents needed in the 
development of a child? Maybe we could replace parents by machines that sustain the life of children until 
they are capable of being self-sustainable? 
Altogether, I think that these arguments are trying to define in a very static and reductionist way a 
concept that is evolving and transforming. Education is an experience. Using static rationality to talk about 
education experience is a mistake commonly made. It reduces education to the accumulation of knowledge 
and a list of achievable outcomes. Freedom itself is not static and cannot be define using a list of arguments 
as discursive as they can be. Freedom as much as Education are relational experiences. I leave it to each 
and every one to find ways to share his-her experience in education to create his-her understanding of 
freedom and-or education.  
With my respect, 





Thank you for taking the time to read this email. This is Matthew Shumski (a member of the Self-Directed 
Education, SDE, research group). I hope you are well.  
"A Students Right to Freedom of Education" is a fantastic paper. It prompted deep thought and I really 
enjoyed reading it. A couple of thoughts came to mind that I wanted to ask: 
1. Something I have been thinking about a lot is the degree of appropriate freedom and direction in 
education for a student with dyslexia. In my experience, most unschooled and SDE children learn to read, 
but I have known a couple who have dyslexia and did not receive support at a young age. What are your 
thoughts on this? How should freedom in edu be negotiated with potential disabilities and/or trauma? I know 
you mentioned this briefly in the meeting, and I would love to know your thoughts.  
2. How should freedom of edu in closed socialization be squared with an individual who opts out of the well 
defined normative practice when the practice relates to safety concerns (i.e. refusing to social distance 
during COVID, etc.)? Maybe this falls under the limitation of illegal activity that you mention at the end. Is 
there a suitable approach to mitigate a refusal through directed education?  
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3. To what extent is it possible to disentangle education with welfare and safety programs when these things 
permit leisure, which in turn permits education? What is the most effective way to parse them out when 
they seem inherently intertwined? The COVID shut down has me thinking and writing about this.  
4. Is there a paper and/or article to learn more about the Bakhtinian Dialogic appriach  and practical 
application? I am really interested in this topic and using it. Admittedly, I have not read much about it; a 
general overview read would be really helpful.   
Thank you again. I really appreciate your work and the opportunities you create through the SDE research 
group. Although I have not joined as much as I'd like to (I plan to join more now that my work has been 
rescheduled), it teaches me a lot and inspires great ideas for my graduate work.  
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